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Are Remittances a ‘Catalyst’ for Financial Access? Evidence 
from Mexican Household Data 
 
Abstract 
In policy discussions, it has frequently been claimed that migrants’ remittances could 
function as a ‘catalyst’ for financial access among receiving households. This paper 
provides empirical evidence on this hypothesis from Mexico, a major receiver of 
remittances worldwide. Using the Mexican Family Life Survey panel (MxFLS) for 
2002 and 2005, the results from the fixed effects logit model show that receiving 
remittances is strongly correlated with the ownership of savings accounts and, to 
some degree, with the availability of borrowing options. These effects are more 
important for rural households than for urban households and are more important 
for microfinance institutions, than for traditional banks. 
 
1. Introduction 
The strong increase in remittances – the money sent by migrants to their families remaining 
in their home country – has given rise to a major debate on the impact of these financial 
flows on receiving countries. This article turns around a question that – although popular in 
policy discussions – has received relatively little attention in the academic literature: 
Remittances and access to financial services among the receivers of remittances. Looking at 
the direct effects of remittances on households and the use of these funds alone ignores 
important aspects of how remittances influence receiving countries. This paper draws 
attention to some of the indirect effects of remittances on the economies of receiving 
countries via its linkages to the financial sector. Moreover, it aims to improve the 
understanding of financial markets in developing countries and how they relate to financial 
management of migrant households. 
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A large part of the population in developing countries lack access to financial services. In 
most Latin American countries, for example, only one-fourth of the population owns 
savings accounts, compared to more than 90 percent for most Western European countries 
(Honohan 2008). This lack of access to financial services among poor households limits 
their strategies for risk management and asset accumulation as poor households often hold 
onto cash or invest it in the form of fixed assets like land and cattle. Furthermore, they have 
limited opportunities to attain credit from formal financial institutions in order to cope with 
unforeseen shocks, finance larger purchases, or invest in small businesses (for a general 
discussion, see Armendáriz de Aghion & Murdoch (2005); for a literature review focusing 
on rural markets, see Conning & Udry (2005)). In this context, linking remittances with 
additional financial services can have positive effects not only on remittance-receiving 
households but also on receiving countries more generally, and has therefore become an 
important issue on the policy agenda (see, for example, Orozco 2004, Terry & Wilson 
2005, and Orozco & Fedewa 2006). First, receivers themselves may benefit from more 
efficient asset-building strategies through monetary savings options and eventually by 
gaining access to other financial services like credit and insurance products. Beyond these 
direct benefits to receivers, linking remittances with financial services has potentially wider 
economic effects. Savings from remittances can be channelled to their most productive use 
and be matched with the demand for credit elsewhere, therefore also benefiting those who 
do not directly receive remittances themselves. To this effect, there is a wide consensus 
among development economists that financial institutions play a crucial role in the process 
of economic development (see Levine 1997 for an overview). For example, cross-country 
studies have shown that a relative increase in savings and credit is associated with an 
increase in both growth and per capita income (Goldsmith 1969; King & Levine 1993; 
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Thorsten Beck et al. 2000b; Thorsten Beck et al. 2000a). Access to financial services is a 
key dimension of financial development because a more inclusive financial sector is 
capable of generating higher absolute levels of savings and investment, reduces dependence 
on foreign capital, and leads to more equitable development (Jalilian & Kirkpatrik 2002; 
Thomas Beck et al. 2007).  
Mexico provides an interesting case for studying the impact of remittances on financial 
access because more than 10 percent of Mexico’s population of circa 110 million people 
live outside their country of birth, forming the largest group of immigrants in the US (Pew 
2009). With more than 22 billion USD of remittances transferred by Mexican migrants to 
their home country in 2009, Mexico is one of the main receivers of remittances worldwide, 
after India and China (World Bank 2011a). Despite a 16 percent decrease in the sending of 
remittances following the 2008 US financial crisis, remittances still play an important role 
in the Mexican economy, as remittances were about the same size as foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to Mexico in 2008, contributing 2.4 percent to Mexico’s GDP (World 
Bank 2011b). At the regional level, remittances are even more important: Michoacán und 
Zacatecas, the states with the highest emigration rates, had remittance-based income 
totalling 13.2 percent and 9.2 percent of GDP in 2006, respectively (Banco de México 
2007). In Mexico, as in many other countries, remittances are usually sent and received in 
cash, and many remittance-receivers belong to lower-income groups, which are excluded 
from the (mainstream) financial system. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section II summarizes the state of current research on 
remittances and financial intermediation, while section III introduces the Mexican Family 
Life Survey (MxFLS), a nationally representative panel data set at the individual and 
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household level that allows researchers to combine information on remittances with access 
to and the usage of financial services. Section IV specifies the estimation strategy of a 
conditional fixed effects logit model and section V discusses the results. Remittances are 
strongly correlated with the ownership of savings accounts and, to some degree, with the 
availability of borrowing options. These effects are more important for rural households 
compared to urban households and more important for microfinance institutions than for 
commercial banks. The final section summarizes these findings and presents conclusions. 
2. Remittances and Financial Access: State of Current 
Research 
In recent years, much research has been done on the manifold impacts of remittances on 
receiving countries.1 This paper focuses on the effects that remittances have on access to 
financial services, a debate strongly dominated by policy papers and practitioners’ 
perspectives presenting case studies on financial institutions that have included remittances 
in their product portfolio and offer additional financial services to remittance receivers. 
Most of these case studies refer to institutions from the microfinance sector that focus on 
lower income clients (Orozco & Hamilton 2005; Hastings 2006; Orozco 2008). Their 
conclusion is that receivers of remittances often match the profile of the typical clients of 
microfinance institutions better than those of commercial banks, and linking remittances 
with microfinance institutions therefore has important positive effects. While providing 
insights into the possibilities and the potential of linking remittances with additional 
financial services, these studies allow for few generalization of findings, do not 
systematically assess the remittance-receivers’ demand for financial services or the success 
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of such initiatives, and do not quantify the linkages between remittances and financial 
intermediation.  
In spite of figuring so prominently in development policy, academia has remained 
relatively silent on the issue, with few studies having systematically approached the impact 
of remittances on the financial sector. Using cross-country panel data, Aggarwal et al. 
(2010) provide global-level evidence that remittances are correlated with deeper financial 
sectors in receiving countries, measured as savings and, to a lesser degree, credit in relation 
to GDP. Following a similar methodology, Gupta et al. (2009) study the impact of 
remittances on financial development specifically for Sub-Saharan Africa and find a 
correlation of remittances with deposits in relation to GDP and money supply M2 in 
relation to GDP. Several arguments explaining why remittances could be beneficial to 
financial development are brought forward by these authors. First, banks may ‘get to know’ 
remittance receivers who did not previously have bank accounts through remittances, 
paving the way for further financial services. Second, remittances may create a demand for 
financial services from receivers because remittances are sent periodically and receivers 
need a safe place to store their savings. Finally, banks can earn income from remittance 
fees, creating an incentive to locate bank branches near remittance-receivers (Aggarwal et 
al. 2010; Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2011). Other authors stress cases where remittances 
might be accepted by financial institutions as a substitute for the lack of formal income 
(Orozco & Fedewa 2006). Cuecuecha & Da Rocha (2011), for example, argue that changes 
in remittances not only affect income and poverty rates directly, but also indirectly by 
facilitating access to credit among receivers. Financial institutions paying remittances are 
able to build a financial history based on remittances for receivers who otherwise lack a 
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formal income – remittances could then be included as an additional source of income to a 
client’s evaluation when requesting credit. Moreover, remittances are sent out of altruistic 
motives and tend to increase and stabilize a household’s income (Bugamelli & Paterno 
2009; Buch & Kuckulenz 2010), reducing the risk of default because remittance receivers 
have additional ‘insurance’, making them less risky debtors from a bank’s point of view. 
Yet, remittances may also function as a substitute for credit and insurance from formal 
financial institutions. Several studies have underlined that a large part of remittances are 
spent on health and other ‘emergency’ spending (Amueda-Dorantes & Pozo 2004a; 
Amueda-Dorantes et al. 2007; Yang & Choi 2007). Remittance-receivers who demand 
financing – due to a loss of work, illness, or other sudden income shocks – are able to rely 
on an additional and relatively stable source of income that is not present to non-receivers. 
Woodruff & Zenteno (2007) and Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz (2009) explicitly argue that 
remittances function as a substitute for a lack of access to productive credit and play an 
important role in financing investment by micro-entrepreneurs, meaning that remittances 
compete with formal financial services, possibly reducing the demand for credits and other 
financial products like insurance. 
Studies on remittances’ impact on the financial sector – similar to other research on 
remittances that rely on time series central bank data – are constrained by the quality of 
macro data. First, reducing transfer costs for formal money transfers shifted transfers away 
from unregistered informal channels (friends, families, couriers, others) towards formal 
transfers (money transfer operators and banks). Second, central banks follow different 
methodologies of data collection and have changed their methodologies over time; part of 
the strong rise in remittances is therefore due to a formalization of remittance flows and 
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changes in data registration (Luna Martinez 2005; for a discussion of the Mexican case, see 
Rodolfo Tuirán et al. 2006; and Canales 2008). Empirical research conducted with central 
bank data must therefore be interpreted with caution, especially for time series data. 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2011) take an alternative approach to studying the impact of 
remittances on financial development on a meso-level in their case study on Mexico, as 
they cross financial data with remittance data at the level of municipalities and find that the 
share of households receiving remittances in a municipality is positively correlated with 
deposits to GDP and, to a minor degree, with credits to GDP at the municipal level.  
This paper contributes to the research questions and findings pioneered by Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al. and Aggarwal et al., and includes important additional issues. First, the MxFLS 
provides a data source at the individual and household levels, including information on the 
migration history, monetary transfers, and the financial service usage of households, which 
allows me to take into account a broader set of socioeconomic variables correlated with 
financial service usage and remittances, and to differentiate the impact of remittances  
according to the socioeconomic status of receiving households. Moreover, unlike 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al., I do not lose information by aggregating data to the municipal level. 
Second, most research on the impact of remittances on the financial sector has been 
restricted to the impact of remittances on the commercial banking sector because, generally 
speaking, only institutions under national banking regulation report data to the national 
financial authorities. The MxFLS data includes financial service usage both on commercial 
banks and (often informal or semi-formal) institutions from the microfinance sector. This 
allows me to include the non-traditional banking sector in the analyses and to differentiate 
the impact of remittances on the financial sector by different kinds of institutions. For 
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poorer households in rural areas, where much of the Mexican migration originates (more 
than half of all remittance-receiving households lived in rural communities with less than 
2,000 inhabitants, see below), non-traditional banking institutions are especially important, 
whereas commercial banks rarely open branches in rural communities. Third, from an 
aggregated macro-level (cross-country) or meso-level (municipal) analysis, it is not 
possible to distinguish between the direct effects of remittances from indirect effects: For 
example, is the correlation of remittances with indicators of financial sector development 
due to a different use of financial services among receiving households or due to 
externalities in the local economy that translate to the financial sector? Fourth, the same 
households in MxFLS are followed over time, allowing me to exploit the panel structure of 
the data and to control for time-constant heterogeneity between households, making my 
analysis less vulnerable to endogeneity concerns.  
3. Data Description 
The Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) is a panel data survey carried out jointly by the 
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica (Center for Research and Teaching in 
Economics, CIDE) and the Universidad Iberoamericana in Mexico City. As a multi-
thematic database, it combines information on financial service usage, migration histories, 
monetary transfers, and a large number of additional socioeconomic characteristics of 
households and individuals. The raw data is organised in several thematic books. The 
present study relies on information from Book 1 (household consumption), Book 2 
(information on type and value of assets owned by the household), Book 3a (employment 
situation), Book 3b (migration history of household members, transfers, use of financial 
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services), and Book C (general household characteristics like the geographic location of the 
households, housing conditions and the number, education levels and age of households 
members). MxFLS is a nationally representative sample of households that were selected 
under criteria of national, urban-rural, and regional representations on pre-established 
demographic and economic variables undertaken by the National Institute of Geography 
Statistics and Information (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, 
INEGI). The approximate sampling size is 8,440 households with approximately 35,000 
individual interviews in 150 communities throughout the Mexican Republic. Out of a total 
of four survey rounds that are planned through 2012, survey results for 2002 and 2005 were 
available at the time of writing. The same households in the MxFLS are followed over time 
so that changes across time can be observed for each household. Some households fell out 
of the sample because they could not be located during the second time period for various 
reasons (they migrated, were deceased, etc). New households entered the sample when 
households from 2002 split into different households in 2005 (when household members 
left the household e.g. in the case of marriage or when household members moved away for 
other reasons). In order to exploit changes during time, I use a balanced data set where I 
only include the 7,572 households that were observed in both time periods (868 households 
of the 2002 sample were not included in the 2005 sample, an attrition rate of 11.5 percent). 
Although not explicitly designed for studying the relationships between remittances and the 
financial sector, several sections contain information that can be exploited for the purpose 
of this study. 
While households were not directly asked about receiving international remittances, this 
information can be constructed indirectly by combining questions on whether households 
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received monetary transfers during the last year (and from whom) and whether they have 
family members that live abroad. Households are classified as remittance-receiving 
households if at least one household member received monetary transfers from a family 
member living in the US during the last year. On average between 2002 and 2005, six 
percent of all households received remittances.2 In rural communities with less than 2,000 
habitants (the definition applied by the national statistics office, INEGI, for rural 
households), 7.8% of all households received remittances, compared to 4.8 percent of 
households in urban areas. 
Access to financial services can be understood and measured in different ways. For 
example, a household might have access to (often unregulated and semi-formal) credit 
unions or savings banks, but not to commercial banks; or might have access to credit, but 
not to savings options. Here, I use two alternative indicators to measure financial access: 
First, whether at least one household member owns a savings account with a financial 
institution, a measurement frequently used in literature on financial access (for example 
Honohan 2008). Alternatively, I use access to borrowing options from financial institutions 
as an indicator for financial access – where households can ask for credit without owning a 
savings account. Many institutions in microfinance, such as the most important player in 
the Mexican Microfinance sector – ‘Compartamos’ –, focus on lending and do not offer 
savings accounts. In the case of credit, I ask for the theoretical availability of credit rather 
than its actual use because I want to measure access – it is more interesting to know 
whether households are able to receive credit if they wanted to, not if they really did: 
Households simply may not have demand for credit. In the case of savings, I am not able to 
measure the availability of savings options and instead measure the actual use (ownership) 
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of savings accounts.3 Using two alternative indicators for financial access allows me to 
draw a more nuanced picture on the impact of remittances on different dimensions of 
financial access.  
Questions regarding the use of financial services were asked individually to all adult 
household members. Based on this information, I create a dummy variable that takes the 
value ‘1’ when at least one household member owns a savings account with a financial 
institution (commercial banks, credit unions, savings banks, or other formal or semi-formal 
institutions from the microfinance sector). Concerning credits, I proceed in the same way 
and create dummies for each household based on whether at least one household member 
knows a financial institution where he/she would be able to obtain a credit. On average, 
over 2002 and 2005, at least one household member owned a savings account in 17 percent 
of all Mexican households; in around 30 percent of households, at least one member had 
borrowing options with a financial institution. These data refer to different types of 
financial institutions and, next to the traditional banking sector, also include credit unions, 
savings banks, and other deposit-taking or lending institutions that offer financial services 
to lower-income segments of the population. Many of these institutions have a local focus 
only and, in some cases, are not formally regulated. Eight percent of households had a 
savings account with a non-traditional banking institution from the heterogeneous 
microfinance sector (compared to 11 percent with commercial banks) and 21 percent of 
households had borrowing options with a microfinance lending institution (compared to 17 
percent that had borrowing options with a commercial bank).4 Among rural households, 
financial access is more restricted: Only nine percent of rural households owned a savings 
account compared to 22 percent among urban households; and 22 percent of rural 
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households had borrowing options with a financial institution compared to 36 percent 
among urban households. Among rural households, financial access is particularly limited 
with respect to commercial banks, which rarely open branches in rural communities. While 
financial services offered by microfinance institutions play an important role both for 
households from urban and for households from rural communities, their importance 
relative to commercial banks is stronger among rural households (see Table 1). 
In order to control for differences between households, additional variables were taken into 
account. I first created a poverty score for each household describing the probability of the 
household falling below a certain poverty line, valued 0 (lowest probability) to 100 (highest 
probability); this index is based on Schreiner (2009) and combines information on the 
number of children in the household, education levels, employment situation, housing 
conditions, and household assets (see Annex 1 for a more detailed description). The score is 
used as a proxy for the socioeconomic status of a household through a one-score summary, 
which allows for the controlling of a number of household characteristics and several 
dimensions of poverty without including them separately in the regression. Next to this 
non-monetary poverty indicator, I also included the monthly per capita spending of 
households as a proxy for income levels. The regression additionally takes into account the 
size of households, whether the household’s head earned income from work or business, 
and whether households benefitted from cash-transfer programs. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the variables used and some descriptive statistics, with a separate description 
for the rural and urban subsets.   
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Table 1: Description of Variables and Summary Statistics 
var. description  pooled rural  urban  
REM binary variable that takes the value ‘1’ for 
households that receive remittances 
mean 6.1% 7.8% 4.8% 
# obs. 14,862 6,166 8,696 
SAV binary variable that takes the value ‘1’ for 
households where at least one household member 
owns a savings account with a financial institution 
mean 16.7% 9.0% 22.4% 
# obs. 13,374 5,697 7,677 
… with a non-traditional banking institution from 
the microfinance sector (savings banks, credit 
unions, etc.) 
mean 7.6% 3.5% 1.8% 
# obs. 12,055 5,372 6,683 
… with a commercial bank mean 11.3% 6.2% 15.4% 
# obs. 12,566 5,525 7,041 
BOR binary variable that takes the value ‘1’ for 
households where at least one household member 
knows a financial institution where they could 
obtain credit 
mean 30.2% 21.6% 36.4% 
# obs. 14,572 6,100 8,472 
… from a microfinance institution  mean 21.1% 15.8% 24.9% 
# obs. 14,572 6,100 8,472 
… from a commercial bank  mean 17.6% 1.2% 23.0% 
# obs. 14,572 6,100 8,472 
CON monthly per capita spending, in Mexican pesos mean 1,186 767 1,478 
s.e. [1,612] [1,039] [1,857] 
#obs 15,144 6,208 8,936 
POV One-score summary for the probability that the 
household falls below a certain poverty line, from 0 
(highest probability) to 100 (lowest probability). 
The index is adapted from Schreiner (2009) and 
combines information on the number of children, 
education levels, employment situation, housing 
conditions, and household assets (see Annex 1) 
mean 58 50 63 
s.e. [17] [18] [15] 
#obs 15,144 6,208 8,936 
SIZ number of household members mean 4.5 4.7 4.4 
s.e. [2.2] [2.4] [2.1] 
#obs 15,144 6,208 8,936 
GOV binary variable that takes the value ‘1’ for 
households that benefitted from cash-transfer 
programs during the previous 12 months  
mean 16.6% 33.5% 4.9% 
# obs. 15,144 6,208 8,936 
WRK binary variable that takes the value ‘1’ for 
households where the household’s head earned 
income during the  previous 12 months 
mean 77.9% 76.0% 79.2% 
# obs. 15,144 6,208 8,936 
RUR binary variable that takes the value ‘1’ for 
households that live in locations with less than 
2,000 inhabitants 
mean 41.0%   
# obs. 15,144 6,208 8,936 
Source: MxFLS 2005 and 2002. Missing values for household size, household consumption, 
government transfers, whether household heads earned income, and for the creation of the 
poverty score have been imputed using the ‘mice’ package (Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn 
2010) in the statistical software R (R Development Core Team 2009).  
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Table 2 compares the ownership of savings accounts and the availability of borrowing 
options among remittance-receiving and non-receiving households separately for rural and 
for urban households and for different types of financial institutions. On average, receiving 
households have better access to financial services, both with respect to the ownership of 
savings accounts and with respect to the availability of borrowing options. Differences 
between the two groups are stronger for savings accounts than for borrowing options and 
more striking when the comparison is restricted to rural households only; the table also 
shows that differences between remittance-receiving and non-receiving households are 
stronger for microfinance institutions (MFI) than for commercial banks. 
 
Table 2: Share of Households (%) with Financial Access, for Remittances-Receiving 
and Non-Receiving Households from Rural and from Urban Communities 
    rural urban 








institution 8.0 12.0 19.6 23.2 
MFI 2.9 5.2 8.2 11.5 




institution 20.5 31.1 35.4 38.3 
MFI 14.8 24.6 24.0 29.7 
commercial banks 9.8 13.5 22.5 19.1 
Source: Own calculation based on MxFLS 2002, 2005. Data is given as average for 
the pooled data from 2002 and 2005. Percentage shares for MFI and commercial 
banks do not sum up to the shares for any financial institution because households can 
have savings accounts and borrowing options with both types of financial institutions. 
 
Table 2 only provides a static picture on access to financial services among Mexican 
households and should not be interpreted causally. The econometric strategy belwo exploits 
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the panel structure of the data by observing how changes in remittances-receiving status are 
correlated with changes in financial access over time. A summary of the time variation for 
the variables on remittances and on financial access is given in Table 3. Many of the 
households who received remittances changed their status between 2002 and 2005. While 
1.3 percent of all households received remittances in both years, almost ten percent 
received remittances in only one of the two years. This large variation in the remittance-
receiving status of households occurred within a period of intense migratory movements 
between Mexico and the US, and a strong increase in registered remittances. Corona & 
Tuirán (2008) estimate that 400,000 emigrants left Mexico every year in the early 2000s, 
corresponding to a yearly net emigration rate of roughly 0.4 percent of Mexico’s population 
of 100 million. In addition, the number of temporary migrants who regularly moved 
between Mexico and the US was estimated to lie at around 600-800,000 (ibid). These 
migratory processes influenced remittances to Mexican households in several ways. On the 
one hand, households turned into remittance-receiving households through the emigration 
of family members. Between 2000 and 2006, registered remittances to Mexico grew by an 
average of more than 26 percent on a yearly basis (World Bank 2011a). On the other hand, 
households that received remittances in 2002 may not have received remittances in 2005, 
either because family members returned to Mexico, because monetary support was not 
given permanently but only for specific one-time purposes, or because transnational links 
became weaker with time (“remittances-decay-hypotheses”, e.g. Merkle & Zimmermann 
1992). Changes in remittance-receiving status may also have been a result of changes in 
household composition, for example when household members who formerly received 
remittances emigrated themselves or left the household for other reasons (such as death, 
marriage, national migration, or others).5  
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Table 3: Time Variation in Remittance-Receiving Status and Financial Access 
  













in t (%) 
receiving remittances 7,290 1.3 4.5 5.2 9.7 
savings account 5,973 7.0 10.6 8.0 18.6 
borrowing options 7,043 12.2 13.4 22.7 36.1 
Source: Own calculation based on MxFLS 2002, 2005 
 
 
With respect to the ownership of savings accounts and the availability of borrowing 
options, many households also reported a change in their status between 2002 and 2005: 
Almost 19 percent of households reported a change of status with respect to savings 
account, and more than 36 percent with respect to borrowing options. Reasons for changes 
in financial access may be due to changes in the socioeconomic status of households 
(including the reception of remittances) or changes occurring within the financial sector 
(e.g. the appearance of new and different institutions or changes in their policy and/or the 
supply of financial services). As with remittances, time variation in access to financial 
services may also reflect changes in household compositions. While more households in 
2005 had borrowing options compared to 2002, such a positive tendency is not visible for 
the ownership of savings accounts. 
4. Model Specification 
I am interested in the effect of receiving remittances on access to financial services. The 
alternative indicators for measuring financial access - the ownership of savings accounts 
and the availability of borrowing options - are measured as dummy variables that take the 
value ‘1’ for households with financial access in a specific time period. The effect of 
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receiving remittances on this binary access variable can be estimated with a panel logit 
model of the following general form:  
!"! !""!" ! ! ! ! !"#!!!!!"#!" ! !!!!!" ! !!!!!! !"#!!!!!"#!" ! !!!!!" ! !!!!!! 
where the probability of having financial access !"" depends on whether household ! 
received remittances (!"#) in time period !, a Matrix of time-variant explanatory variables !!" and household fixed effects !!. Here, ! are the estimated coefficients. The time-variant 
variables in !!" include household size, the log of per capita consumption, a multi-
dimensional poverty score, whether households benefitted from cash-transfer programs, 
and whether the household head earned income from work or business (see Table 1 for a 
description). Next to these time-variant variables, !! contains all time-constant variables 
that determine access and may also be correlated with receiving status of households, such 
as their geographic location, cultural variables, and generally different propensities to use 
financial services.6 
As an alternative to the fixed effects model, estimation can be done using random effects 
where the unobserved values !! are themselves given a probability distribution (cp. 
Wooldridge 2002, p.474f). Estimations from the random effects model are, however, biased 
if !! is not independent across observations, as it would be expected in most applications. 
The main advantage of panel data is precisely to get rid of the unobserved effect and 
therefore to reduce the danger of biased estimates. Remittance-receiving households may 
differ from non-receiving households on dimensions that are difficult to control for directly 
with cross-sectional data, such as cultural differences, or other latent differences in 
motivation and skills, etc. Using a Hausman-type test, the assumption that the coefficients 
 18 
from the random effects model are unbiased can formally be tested by comparing them to 
the unbiased estimates from the fixed effect model. 
As shown by Chamberlain (1980; 1984), the fixed effects logit model can be estimated by 
conditional maximum likelihood, where the constant household fixed effects !! are 
conditioned out of the likelihood function.7 However, getting unbiased estimates from the 
conditional fixed effects logit model has several trade-offs: First, the coefficients ! are 
estimated from households only with a variation on the response variable (all those 
households with variation in financial access as shown in Table 3), whereas households 
without variation in this variable drop out of the likelihood function. The number of 
observations from which to estimate an effect of remittances on financial access is therefore 
lower than the total number of households in the sample. Consequently, the standard errors 
from the estimation can be expected to be larger, especially with short time periods as in 
this case. Second, partial effects on the response probabilities cannot be estimated unless 
values are plugged in for the unknown parameter !!. Estimation results therefore have to be 
interpreted as odds ratios. Finally, no coefficients can be estimated for the constant 
variables; this is, however, not a serious concern since the main interest lies on the 
correlation of remittances with access to financial service, while constant variables such as 
the location of households act as control variables. 
5. Regression Results 
After evaluating different fits to the data, alternative specifications for the logit model are 
presented in Table 4a (for the ownership of savings accounts) and 4b (for the availability of 
borrowing options). Specifications I and II give results for all households and for all kinds 
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of financial institutions, alternatively estimated with a random effects model (spec. I) and  
with household fixed effects, using conditional maximum likelihood (spec. II). Coefficients 
for the two indicators for financial access in Table 4a and 4b follow, in general, similar 
tendencies in the random effects and the fixed effects version of the model. In specification 
I without households fixed effects, additional time-invariant variables are included for the 
location of households. The coefficients for ‘rural’ are negative and significant in both 
Tables 4a and 4b, confirming that rural households had a lower probability of having access 
to financial services. In addition, state dummies for 16 of the 32 Mexican states from which 
households were sampled are included in order to control for regional differences that are 
not captured by variables at the household level. The models with household fixed effects 
are preferred over the random effects models because they allow controlling for all time-
invariant characteristics of households. The Hausman test statistics of 110 (Table 4a) and 
40 (Table 4b) on 7 degrees of freedom lead to a rejection of the model without fixed 
effects.  
In addition to the pooled model in specification II, specifications III to VIII show results 
from the fixed effects model for different subsets and for alternative definitions of the 
dependent variable. The pooled fixed effects regressions on all financial institution (spec. 
II) show that the probability of having financial access, measured either as the ownership of 
a savings account or as the availability of borrowing options, is lower for poor households. 
This is true for the monetary poverty indicator (log of monthly per capita spending) as well 
as for the non-monetary poverty indicator (poverty score). This correlation is as expected, 
because poor households face more obstacles in gaining access to financial services. The 
probability of having access to financial services is also higher for households where the 
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household head gained income from work or business. The larger the household size, the 
higher the probability that at least one household member has access to financial services. 
Having benefitted from cash transfer programs is also positively correlated with financial 
access. Government support programs may have a positive effect on the socioeconomic 
status of households and could also have a positive influence on access to financial services 
when paid through financial institutions. This correlation is, however, weak and statistically 
significant (at a 10% level) only for the ownership of a savings account. 
The main interest lies on the correlation between remittances and financial access. With 
respect to the ownership of savings accounts, the coefficient for remittances is large and 
significant. The coefficient is larger in the fixed effects model (spec. II), compared to the 
random effects model (spec. I), indicating that the estimation from the cross-sectional 
variation across households underestimates the correlation between remittances and 
financial access. 
The correlation between remittances and the ownership of savings accounts differs across 
different groups and for different types of institutions. The pooled models on all households 
(specs. I and II) include an interaction term for remittance-receiving status with the poverty 
score of households. The negative and statistically significant interaction term between 
receiving status and poverty score implies that the effect of remittances on the ownership of 
savings accounts is larger for poor households. For them, receiving remittances increases 
the probability of owning a savings account in a sizeable manner, while for richer 
households the probability of owning a savings account increases much less (or does not 
increase) with remittances. 
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These differences in the effect of receiving remittances on financial access between 
households from different socioeconomic backgrounds are also reflected in different 
patterns among urban compared to rural households, which are generally characterized by 
higher poverty rates. Dividing the sample into an urban and a rural subset shows a large and 
statistically significant effect of remittances on the ownership of savings accounts for rural 
households (specs. VI to VIII), while the coefficient is smaller for urban households and 
statistically significant at a 10%-level only in spec. III. Taking a closer look at different 
types of institutions shows that the positive correlation between remittances and the 
ownership of savings accounts within rural households is dominated by non-traditional 
institutions from the microfinance sector (spec. VIII) because the size and statistical 
significance of the coefficient is lower for commercial banks (spec. VI).  
As mentioned above, partial effects on the response probabilities cannot be estimated from 
the conditional fixed effects logit model because of the unknown fixed effects parameter !!; 
probabilities must therefore be interpreted as odds ratios.8 For example, in the case of 
ownership of savings accounts among rural households (spec. III in Table 4a), the odds for 
receivers (!"# ! !) over the odds of non-receivers (!"# ! !) is !"# !!! ! !! or 300% 
higher, holding other variables at a fixed value. Especially among rural households, the 
effect of remittances on the ownership of savings account is large in size and highly 
significant compared to other predictors related to the socioeconomic status of households. 
With respect to the availability of borrowing options (Table 4b), the effect of remittances is 
less clear than in the case of savings accounts and the hypothesis that remittances may be 
accepted as collateral by financial institutions and therefore facilitate access to credit is 
only supported to some degree by the data. Whereas the coefficient for remittances and its 
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interaction with the poverty score is statistically significant in the random effects 
specification (spec. I), the pooled fixed effects specification (spec. II) does not point to a 
statistically significant relationship when an interaction term is included. In the alternative 
subsets (spec. III – VIII), a statistically significant effect at a 10% confidence level is found 
for rural households, where the effect is significant for microfinance institutions, but not for 
commercial banks. A higher significance of this coefficient for microfinance institutions is 
plausible because, in general, commercial banks would not be expected to accept income 





Table 4a: Logit Regression on the Likelihood of Owning a Savings Account  
  Random 
Effects Conditional Maximum Likelihood (Household Fixed Effects) 
subset pooled  urban  rural 
Dep. Variable any inst. any inst.  any inst. banks mfi  any inst. banks mfi 
  I II  III IV V  VI VII VIII 
(Intercept) -11.29***           
[.443]            
RUR -.460***           
[.085]            
REM 1.371*** 2.577***  .532* .504 .477  1.392*** .929** 2.767*** 
[.512]  [.877]   [.272]  [.350]  [.406]   [.388]  [.459]  [1.044]  
REM*POV -.017** -.028**          
[.008]  [.014]                
CON .711*** .345***  .314*** .357*** .286**  .448*** .682*** .13 
[.043]  [.070]   [.083]  [.104]  [.134]   [.142]  [.19]  [.242]  
GOV .108 .293*  .442 .586 .416  .297 .322 .329 
[.105]  [.169]   [.323]  [.441]  [.465]   [.213]  [.274]  [.353]  
POV .049*** .016**  .013* .004 .027**  .018 .031** .013 
[.003]  [.006]   [.007]  [.009]  [.012]   [.011]  [.015]  [.018]  
WRK .313*** .439***  .423** .194 .843***  .458 .473 .611 
  [.082]  [.162]   [.200]  [.254]  [.320]   [.290]  [.380]  [.498]  
SIZ .297*** .105*  .092 .152 .079  .205 .274 .108 
[.019]  [.059]   [.068]  [.096]  [.096]   [.131]  [.182]  [.202]  
state fixed 
effects  
(yes) (no)  (no) (no) (no)  (no) (no) (no) 
log likelihood -5058 -771  -560 -346 -237  -199 -128 -76 
# obs. 13,374 2,233  1,719 1,083 725  514 342 189 
# parameters 25 7  6 6 6  6 6 6 
Hausman Chi^2 (dof) 110.4 (7)                 
Stars denote significance at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**) and 10 percent (*). Results are reported for different subsets and 
definitions of the dependent variable. See Table 1 for the definition of variables. Hausman test statistics are given for spec. II (with 
household fixed effects) against spec. I (random effects).  
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Table 4b: Logit Regression on the Likelihood of Having Borrowing Options 
  Random 
Effects Conditional Maximum Likelihood (Household Fixed Effects) 
subset pooled  urban  rural 
Dep. Variable any inst. any inst.  any inst. banks mfi  any inst. banks mfi 
  I II  III IV V  VI VII VIII 
(Intercept) -6.97***           
[.263]            
RUR -.344***           
[.051]            
REM .729** .375  .165 -.103 .307  .329* .224 .346* 
[.318]  [.476]   [.201]  [.22]  [.216]   [.18]  [.251]  [.193]  
REM*POV -.009* -.002          
[.005]  [.008]                
CON .349*** .228***  .220*** .200*** .254***  .243*** .357*** .19** 
[.026]  [.044]   [.057]  [.061]  [.066]   [.073]  [.102]  [.084]  
GOV .056 .049  .367* .158 .445*  -.079 -.076 -.063 
[.063]  [.101]   [.214]  [.258]  [.231]   [.118]  [.163]  [.134]  
POV .032*** .019***  .019*** .016*** .018***  .017*** .023*** .012* 
[.002]  [.004]   [.005]  [.006]  [.006]   [.006]  [.008]  [.007]  
WRK .274*** .113  -.041 -.357** .008  .351** -.008 .362* 
  [.053]  [.109]   [.146]  [.162]  [.159]   [.173]  [.222]  [.202]  
SIZ .257*** .347***  .437*** .610*** .305***  .200*** .268*** .144* 
[.012]  [.045]   [.062]  [.082]  [.061]   [.070]  [.091]  [.079]  
state fixed 
effects  
(yes) (no)  (no) (no) (no)  (no) (no) (no) 
log likelihood -8110 -1761  -1122 -902 -891  -598 -353 -457 
# obs. 14,572 4,402  3,088 1,945 2,108  1,314 623 961 
# parameters 25 7  6 6 6  6 6 6 
Hausman Chi^2 (dof) 40.2 (7)                 
Stars denote significance at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**) and 10 percent (*). Results are reported for different subsets and 
definitions of the dependent variable. See Table 1 for the definition of variables. Hausman test statistics are given for spec. II (with 
household fixed effects) against spec. I (random effects).
 In addition to the regression outputs in Tables 4a and 4b, Figure 1 plots coefficients and 
95% confidence intervals for remittance-receiving status in order to graphically summarize 
how remittances affect the availability of borrowing options (left graph) and the ownership 
of savings accounts (right graph) for different subgroups and for different outcome 
variables. Coefficients are given for the pooled model (at the top, as spec. II without the 
interaction term on poverty), for the rural subset (at the center, as spec. III to V), and the 
urban subset (at the bottom, as spec. VI to VIII). Black lines within each set of coefficient 
lines are based on a regression on all financial institutions. Upper grey lines show 
regression results on non-traditional banking institutions only (credit unions, savings banks, 
and other institutions from the microfinance sector), and lower grey lines refer to 
commercial banks only.  
As discussed, Figure 1 reveals a stronger effect for savings accounts than for borrowing 
options, and a stronger and more significant effect for the rural subset and for the 
specifications based on microfinance institutions only. Linkages between remittances and 
the financial sector are more important for non-traditional financial institutions from the 
microfinance sector than for the commercial banking sector. These results support the 
argument made by Orozco & Hamilton (2005), Hastings (2006), and Orozco (2008), among 
others, that institutions from the microfinance sector are often ‘closer’ to remittance-
receivers, both socially and geographically, and are therefore better positioned to link 
remittances with further financial services. It seems that remittances function as a ‘catalyst’ 
for financial access, especially for rural households from lower income groups, who tend to 
use non-traditional financial institutions from the microfinance sector more than 
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commercial banks. This confirms the first impression from the simple data description in 
section III (Table 2) after a more thorough statistical analysis. 
 
Figure 1: Estimated Coefficients for Remittance-Receiving Status, for Different 
Access Indicators and Subgroups 
 
The graph plots the estimated coefficients for remittance-receiving status on the ownership 
of savings accounts and the availability of borrowing options with 50 percent and 95 
percent confidence intervals for all (upper plotted lines), rural (middle) and urban (lower 
plotted lines) households. The black lines in the middle of each set of plotted lines show 
estimates and confidence intervals for the regression on all types of financial institutions. 
Alternatively, I also provide estimates for a regression on microfinance institutions only 
(upper grey lines) and on commercial banks only (lower grey lines). Estimates are given in 
logit scale.  
 
 
The model has been estimated from variation within households, controlling for time-
constant heterogeneity. Results should therefore not be biased due to unobserved 
differences across households, such as motivations and skills, which is a common concern 
in migration research. Two arguments could still be brought forward against a causal 














institutions and therefore be correlated with remittances. However, financial institutions are 
not only an improbable source of financing largely informal migration, where repayment is 
difficult to enforce. Also, the conditional fixed effects logit uses information from 
households only with variation on the dependent variable. Households with financial access 
prior to receiving remittances do not report changes on this variable and therefore drop out 
of the likelihood function. 
A second possible objection to a causal interpretation of the findings is that access to 
financial services makes receiving remittances easier. This is not a very strong concern 
because transfers are in most cases cash-based and do not require bank accounts. Moreover, 
the strongest effect is found for microfinance institutions, which are usually not integrated 
into global payment systems. The assumption that remittances are not driven by changes in 
financial access can be tested empirically, taking the existence of close family relationships 
across borders, which have been identified as a good predictor for sending remittances in a 
large number of studies (Carling 2008, p.588) as a proxy for remittances. Table 5 shows 
results for the likelihood of owning a savings accounts or of having borrowing options with 
a financial institution, replacing remittances with a variable on the existence of close 
relatives (either a parent, child, spouse, or sibling) in the US. Again, results from the fixed 
effects specification are given for the urban and the rural subset next to a pooled 
specification on all households, and alternatively for the ownership of savings accounts and 
for the availability of borrowing options. Results using a proxy variable for remittances 
confirm the general findings. Also, in this case, the correlation is more relevant for savings 
accounts and stronger for rural households compared to urban households. Coefficients are 
smaller than in the direct regression on remittances, which is plausible considering that the 
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number of observations with close relatives in the US (around 34 percent) is considerably 
larger than the number of remittance-receiving households (around six percent). 
 
Table 5: Logit Regression on the Likelihood of Having Financial Access, Using the 
Existence of Close Relatives in the US as a Proxy for Remittances 
  Conditional Maximum Likelihood (Household Fixed Effects) 
Dep. Variable ownership of savings 
accounts 
 availability of borrowing options 
subset pooled urban rural  pooled urban rural 
  I II III  IV V VI 
MIG .549*** .464*** .899***  .088 -.102 .43*** 
[.131]  [.153]  [.282]   [.084]  [.104]  [.148]  
CON .353*** .312*** .479***  .233*** .225*** .254*** 
[.070]  [.083]  [.140]   [.044]  [.057]  [.073]  
GOV .364** .513 .421**  .053 .365* -.074 
[.169]  [.325]  [.215]   [.101]  [.214]  [.118]  
POV .013** .011 .020*  .018*** .019*** .016*** 
[.006]  [.007]  [.011]   [.004]  [.005]  [.006]  
WRK .355** .406** .189  .111 -.042 .342** 
[.161]  [.199]  [.291]   [.109]  [.146]  [.173]  
SIZ .069 .069 .121  .346*** .444*** .200*** 
[.058]  [.068]  [.122]   [.045]  [.062]  [.070]  
log likelihood -771 -560 -199  -1761 -1122 -599 
# obs. 2,233 1,719 514  4,403 3,088 1,315 
# parameters 6 6 6   6 6 6 
The variable ‘MIG’ is a binary variable that takes the value ‘1’ for households where at 
least one member had a close relative in the US. The dependent variables ‘ownership of 
savings accounts’ and ‘availability of borrowing options’ refer to any kind of financial 
institution (commercial banks or MFI). Stars denote significance at 1 percent (***), 5 




This study contributes to the understanding of how remittances influence economic 
development in receiving countries by focusing on a relatively neglected research topic, the 
impact of remittances on access to financial services. The results are important because 
they underline some of the indirect effects of remittances on receiving countries, while 
focusing solely on the spending of remittances misses an important part of the picture. 
As the results show, remittances have an important effect on the ownership of savings 
accounts among receiving households in Mexico and, to some degree, on the availability of 
borrowing options. The presented evidence based on household data confirms that 
previously found correlations between remittances and financial development using either 
municipal level bank data (Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2011) or cross-country central bank 
data (Aggarwal et al. 2010; Gupta et al. 2009) are not (or not only) due to externality 
effects in the local economy, but that remittances affect the financial sector directly through 
better access among receiving households. Remittances are the most important as a 
‘catalyst’ for financial access for poorer households from rural areas, while they make little 
difference to wealthier households from urban areas.  
Previous studies from aggregated data could not differentiate the impact of remittances 
according to different types of institutions because non-traditional financial institutions 
from the microfinance sector usually fall outside banking regulations and are therefore not 
captured by official data. Nevertheless, they are the most important financial service 
providers for low-income households in developing countries. At least in the case of 
Mexico, traditional banks do not seem to be the most adequate institutions for linking 
remittances with further financial services, though technically better prepared for including 
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remittances into their product portfolio. Many banks in Mexico do pay remittances: 
‘Bancomer’ alone has an estimated share of 60 percent in the Mexican remittance market 
(Hernández-Coss 2005). However, in most cases, remittances are sent and received in cash, 
with bank branches functioning as paying agents to US-based money transfer operators. 
Commercial banks apparently use their market power only to a limited degree for gaining 
new clients among remittance-receivers.  
Findings support the argument that microfinance institutions are particularly well suited for 
linking remittances with further financial services, although they face several obstacles in 
doing so (see Orozco & Hamilton 2005; Hastings 2006; Orozco 2008). These institutions 
typically have a local focus and are usually not integrated into national, and even less into 
global, payment systems. They may not often have the institutional capacities for complex 
cross-border transfers in terms of liquidity management and information management 
systems, among others, either. Additionally, regulatory constraints regarding activities in 
foreign currencies or restrictions in offering certain financial services can be an obstacle for 
MFIs to enter remittance markets (Sander 2008). From a policy perspective, the challenge 
lies in providing adequate regulatory frameworks for microfinance institutions and 
implementing policies that help them bridge their local and pro-poor focus with access to 
global payment systems. 
The lack of access to financial services and the concentration of commercial banks on 
urban centers and high-income neighbourhoods are typical features of many developing 
countries. Findings from the case study on Mexico may therefore bear lessons for other 
countries as well, where receiving households belong to rural and/or lower income 
segments that are typically not attended by the banking sector. Remittances are private 
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income of transnational households – institutional frameworks that open monetary savings 
and borrowing options and provide more efficient use of remittances for families are 







                                                
!"Research on the impact of remittances on the receiving countries has focused on reducing 
poverty (Adams & Page 2005), the creation of growth through multiplier effects (Durand et 
al. 1996; Glytsos 2005), and their ambiguous effects on inequality in remittance-receiving 
countries (Jones 1998; Koechlin & León 2006; P. Acosta et al. 2008). More pessimistic 
authors have criticized remittances for reducing incentives for productive investment of 
resources in the countries of origin (Chami et al. 2003), possibly leading to a loss in 
international competitiveness through the appreciation of the exchange rate (Amueda-
Dorantes & Pozo 2004b; P. A. Acosta et al. 2009), and the fact that money acquired from 
remittances may be spent on luxury goods with few benefits for the local economy (Lipton 
1980; Lazaar 1987; Binford 2003). Recently, more optimistic positions have dominated 
research. A number of studies have found empirical evidence that receivers of remittances 
spend a larger share of their income on education (Cox Edwards & Ureta 2003; Adams & 
Cuecuecha 2010), health (Amueda-Dorantes et al. 2007; Adams & Cuecuecha 2010), and 
entrepreneurship (Massey & Parrado 1998; Woodruff & Zenteno 2007). Other studies have 
addressed the impact of remittances on the balance of payments of remittance-receiving 
countries (Bugamelli & Paterno 2009; Singer 2010; Buch & Kuckulenz 2010). As a-
cyclical source of external finance, they help to stabilize the balance of payments and can 
play a strategic role in the prevention of financial crises. In the wake of the recent global 
financial crises, remittances have also proven to be more stable than other private capital 
flows like private lending, foreign direct investment, or portfolio investment (Chami et al. 
2009; Ratha & Mohapatra 2009). 
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2 In some cases, households could not be clearly classified into remittance-receiving 
households. Respondents only replied if they received transfers from a sibling, an 
uncle/aunt, parents, etc. For example, if a respondent has two brothers, one living in the US 
and another living in a different household in Mexico, it is not possible to know from the 
survey data whether the respondent received the transfer from the brother living in Mexico, 
or a different brother living in the US. I classify these households as remittance-receiving 
households although there is some uncertainty in this classification and some of these 
transfers might actually be national remittances. Even so, I consider this variable to be a 
good proxy for international remittances. The estimates for the share of remittance-
receiving households based on this procedure are very similar to the estimates on 
remittances from other sources. According to Esquivel & Huerta-Pineda (2007), 
estimations based on ENIGH 2002 (Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los Hogares, 
a biannual household survey carried out by the Mexican Statistics Institute INEGI) indicate 
that 5.7 percent of Mexican households received remittances in 2002. This was 5.9 percent 
of households in 2008, with 41.1 percent of remittances going to rural households (based 
on ENIGH 2008, according to Sánchez Ruiz 2010).  
3 Of course, households with borrowing options can still be denied credit. Even so, I prefer 
an indicator on the availability of credit to an indicator on the use of credit in order to 
distinguish financial access from the demand for financial services. I also tested the impact 
of a change in remittance status on the actual use of credit from financial institutions, see 
footnote 9.  
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4 A relatively large number of interviewees did not answer the questions on financial 
service usage and borrowing options, which reduces the number of observations available 
for the regression analysis (see Table 1 on the number of available observations for each of 
the variables). 
5 While the large variation in remittance-receiving status allows for the exploitation of the 
time variation of the data, the short time dimension and a relatively small number of 
households who did not change their status during the time frame limits the possibility of 
studying the lagged effect of remittances on financial access, in addition to their 
contemporaneous effect. 
6 The household fixed effects !! also additionally control for selection bias due to 
households dropping out of the sample because the propensity to drop out of the sample can 
be seen as part of !!. 
7 The strategy consists in finding the joint distribution of the response variable !""! 
conditional on !!, !!, and  !! ! !""!"!!!!""! , where !! can take the values {0,1,2} in the 
case of two time periods (T=2). It turns out that this conditional distribution does not 
depend on !!, so that it is also the distribution of !""! given !! and !!. Therefore, standard 
conditional maximum likelihood methods can be used to estimate ! (see Wooldridge 2002, 
p.492 for details).  
8 Probabilities can be expressed in terms of ‘odds’, which are defined as the ratio of the 
probability of a positive outcome of an event (in this case, the probability that the indicator 
for financial access !"" takes the value ‘1’) over the probability of a negative outcome 
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(the probability that !"" takes the value ‘0’). The ‘odds ratios’ for a predictor variable (in 
this case, remittance-receiving status of households) are calculated as the odds of receiving 
households against the odds of non-receiving households and can be obtained through 
exponentiation of the logistic regression coefficients. While less intuitive than an 
interpretation of probabilities on the original scale, the advantage of odds ratios in logistic 
regression is that they can be scaled up without running into boundary problems for 
probabilities between 0 and 1. 
9 As mentioned above, the availability of borrowing options does not mean that households 
actually obtain loans. I also tested the effect of receiving remittances on actual borrowing 
and did not find a significant effect. This could point to the possibility that, as discussed 
above, remittances function as a substitute for credit from formal financial services and that 
the demand for credit is therefore lower among receiving households. 
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8. Annex 
Annex 1: Creation of a Poverty Score for Mexican Households, adapted from 
Schreiner (2009) 
  scoring indicator book answers points 
1 number of household members aged 
0 to 17 
C four or more 0 
three 7 
two 15 
one  22 
none 29 
2 highest educational grade among 
household members 
C college preparatory or less 0 
normal/technical/commercial 4 
professional or graduate 10 
3 number of household members with 
a written employment contract 
3a none 0 
one 7 
two or more 14 
4 main flooring type used in residence C dirt 0 
cement/concrete 8 
other 12 
5 tap water inside the house C yes 3 
no 0 
6 fuel usually used to cook or heat 
food 
C firewood 0 
other 5 
7 household has domestic appliances 
(blender, iron, microwave, toaster, 
etc.) 
2 yes 7 
no 0 
8 electric appliances used in the 
household (radio, TV, VCR, 
computer, etc.) 
2 yes 7 
no 0 
9 household has other assets like dryer, 
washing machine, stove, or 
refrigerator  
2 yes 13 
no 0 
  maximum value   100 
Creation of a ‘poverty score’ for each household from MxFLS 2002 and 2005: A 
score of ‘100’ indicates the lowest probability of belonging to a poor household and a 
score of ‘0’ indicates the highest probability of belonging to a poor household. The 
scoring is based on Schreiner (2009) and was developed in order to allow a quick and 
easy assessment of the socioeconomic conditions of households. Questions 7 to 9 have 
been adapted to the availability of data. Incomplete data on some variables have been 
imputed using the ‘mice’ package (Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2010) in the 
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